Information security

Wireless sensor networks and civil security

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Our research

- Three research areas
 - Security metrics
 - Wireless sensor networks
 - Denial of service

- Focus on this presentation
 - Wireless sensor networks

Security metrics and denial of service

Sensor networks and civil security




Distributed Computing and Systems
Chalmers university of technology


Talk outline


- Sensor networks
- Security in sensor networks
- Clock synchronization
- Clustering
- Conclusions







Deployment








Wireless ad-hoc networks



Sensor node limitations


MicaZ sensor node example

CPU	7MHz
Program Memory	128 kB
RAM	4 kB
Storage Memory	512 kB



Agriculture – water monitoring The COMMONsense project, India





Structural health monitoring The Stork bridge, Switzerland






Volcanic research – seismic activity Tungurahua, Ecuador



Civil security possibilities

- Disaster area networks
 - Situational awareness
 - Getting communications up
- Forest fire detection
 - Early warning
 - Follow the sequence of events
- Border and perimeter security
 - Intrusion detection







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
Security compared to normal networks

- Limitations
 - Public key expensive
 - Key sizes limited
- Threats
 - Compromises
 - Extract information
 - Take over nodes
 - Destroy nodes
 - Denial of Service
 - Jam radio



Fault tolerance

- Nodes get lost
 - Harsh environments
 - Batteries run out
 - Adversarial attacks




Possibility to withstand lost nodes Possibility to refill the network

Robustness and self-stabilization

- Harsh environments
 - Sensor readings go bad
 - Node states go bad
- Incorrect input
 - Data from compromised nodes
 - Messages corrupted in transmission
- Temporary deviations from assumptions


Need to cope with unexpected data Stabilization from arbitrary state is powerful



Security in sensor networks

- A secure sensor network is not only about secure communications
- We also need
 - Fault tolerance
 - Attacks destroying nodes
 - Robustness
 - Compromised nodes sending bad data
 - Self-stabilization
 - Recover from being overwhelmed

Many services to secure



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
The need for clock synchronization

- Following movements
- Pinpointing events geographically
- TDMA radio scheduling
- Ordering sensor data
- Detecting duplicate events
- Coordinating sleep cycles
- ...





Errors in clock synchronization



Contributions


- Clock Synchronization
 - Secure
 - Self-stabilizing
- Deals with
 - Outside attacks
 - Compromised nodes


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Clustering – organize ad-hoc networks





Uses of clustering

Backbones






Scaling



Saving power





Contribution

- Clustering
 - Self-stabilizing
 - Provides redundancy
- Multiple cluster heads and multiple paths
 - Help withstand attacks
 - Increased fault tolerance

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Conclusions

- Many possible civil security-related applications
 - Fault-tolerance and security is needed
 - Insider nodes are a serious threat

- We provide fundamental services
 - Clock synchronization
 - Clustering
 - Routing
 - Cryptography

Thank you for your attention!