

# ADAM: An Automatic & Extensible Platform To Stress Test Android Anti-Virus Systems

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
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# Android Malware

## Up 3,325% in 2011

1. This past year, we saw a significant **increase** in mobile malware.
  - A. Juniper Networks Mobile Threat Center: **400** to **13,302**.
  - B. Antiy: **12,000**.
  - C. Tencent: **10,000**.
2. **Spyware** and premium rate SMS **Trojans** are the most popular Android malware.



# Motivation Of **ADAM** System

Both **academic community** and **commercial anti-virus companies** proposed many methodologies and products.

how to assess the **effectiveness** of these defense mechanisms?

Especially malware **mutation**.

# Related Work Of **ADAM** System

1. No **byte code** level obfuscation research on Android malware before.  
e.g. Jha, Testing Malware Detectors, 04; Moser, Limits of Static Analysis for Malware Detection. ACSAC 07
2. No **large-scale** evaluation on **40+** anti-virus and **200\*8+** malware on Android before.  
e.g. Felt. A survey of mobile malware in the wild, SPSM 11
3. No **automatic** Anti-virus test system on Android before.  
e.g. Jiang, Dissecting Android Malware, Oakland12.

# Our Work Of **ADAM** System


We propose:

**ADAM** which can **automatically** transform an original sample to different **variants** via **repackaging** and **obfuscation** techniques. Then **stress test** anti-virus products.

# Introduction

## To **Apk and Disassemble**

1. The **.apk** file contains all of the information necessary to run the application on a device or emulator, such as compiled **.dex** file, a binary version of the **AndroidManifest.xml** file, **compiled resources** (resources.arsc) and **uncompiled resource files** for your application.
2. The disassemble process takes the Dalvik opcodes of a **.dex** file and converts them into **low-level** and **human readable instructions**. Typically, the decoded **.smali** files can be rebuilt again back to a **.dex** file.



# System Design Of ADAM

1. **Security analysis.**  
*For original sample and variants.*
2. **Automated transformation.**  
*no source code need.*
3. **Extensibility.**  
*Plug-in new detection systems or obfuscation techniques.*




Fig. 1. Design flow of ADAM.

# Obfuscation Technique Of **Repackaging**

Repackaging methods that work directly on an input .apk file and regenerate a different .apk file without modifying the source code of the input .apk file.

<1>. Alignment.

The process only changes the cryptographic hash of the .apk file.

<2>. Re-sign.

An .apk file can be re-signed multiple times with different certificates.

<3>. Rebuild.

Disassembles an .apk file and rebuilds the assembly code (without being modified) into another .apk file.



# Evaluation Of Repackaging

1. We collect a total of **222** distinct Android malware samples.

2. Online Engine: **VirusTotal**.

3. Note that VirusTotal hosts over **40** anti-virus products, and our study only focuses on the top **10** products.

AV Products	Original	Alignment	Re-sign	Rebuild
F-Secure	93.24%	95.28%	94.59%	89.05%
Kaspersky	93.24%	90.09%	89.64%	62.38%
Emsisoft	90.99%	90.09%	87.84%	61.90%
Ikarus	90.99%	90.09%	87.84%	61.43%
GData	88.74%	92.45%	91.44%	86.67%
Sophos	88.74%	86.32%	86.49%	68.10%
Antiy-AVL	86.04%	75.00%	73.42%	54.76%
TrendMicro	85.59%	75.94%	74.32%	53.81%
Fortinet	79.28%	68.87%	68.47%	43.33%
NOD32	77.93%	55.66%	52.25%	35.24%
Overall Average	87.48%	81.98%	80.63%	61.67%

Repackaging, **October 2011**

# Analysis Of **Rebuild** Technique

Class 0: `public final mars.testbc.R$attr`  
 Class 1: `public final mars.testbc.R$drawable`  
 Class 2: `public final mars.testbc.R$id`  
 Class 3: `public final mars.testbc.R$layout`  
 Class 4: `public final mars.testbc.R$string`  
 Class 5: `public final mars.testbc.R`  
 Class 6: `mars.testbc.TestActivity$Broadcast`  
 Class 7: `public mars.testbc.TestActivity`  
 Class 8: `public mars.testbc.TestReceiver`

**Original**

`public final mars.testbc.R$attr`  
`public mars.testbc.TestActivity`  
`public final mars.testbc.R$id`  
`public final mars.testbc.R$drawable`  
`public mars.testbc.TestReceiver`  
`public final mars.testbc.R$layout`  
`mars.testbc.TestActivity$Broadcast`  
`public final mars.testbc.R$string`  
`public final mars.testbc.R`

**Rebuild**

# Obfuscation Technique

## Of Code Obfuscation

Code obfuscation changes the size and content of the .apk file by rebuilding the assemble code, but without modifying the logical behavior.

<1>. Inserting defunct methods.

The rationale of this obfuscation technique is to modify the method table in the Dalvik bytecode.

<2>. Renaming methods.

We obfuscate the method name with a different string, and hence change the signature that is generated by the method name.

# Obfuscation Technique

## Of Code Obfuscation

<3>. Changing control flow graphs.

we modify the CFG without changing the logic behavior of a .smali file and so as to change its CFG signature.

<4>. Encrypting constant strings.

We encrypt all constant strings that we find in a .smali file, and decrypt them when they are being processed by modifying the invoking instructions.

# Analysis Of Encrypt Technique

We can encrypt a string “DecryptString” in a TextView control by subtracting all bytes by 10. The encrypted string will become “:[Yhofjljh\_d]”.

We then add the decryption method decrypt (i.e., by adding all bytes by 10) before the TextView control is called.

```
#direct methods
.method public static DecryptString\
(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/String;
...
const-string v1, ":[Yhofjljh_d]"
...
invoke-static { v1}, \
Lcom/test;->DecryptString\
(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/String;
move-result-object v1
invoke-virtual {v0, v1}, Landroid/\
widget/TextView;->setText\
(Ljava/lang/CharSequence;)V
```

Fig. 5. Encrypting a constant string.

# Evaluation Of Repackaging and Code Obfuscation

AV Products	Original	Alignment	Re-sign	Rebuild
Kaspersky	95.95%	94.34%	94.59%	94.76%
F-Secure	95.50%	95.75%	95.05%	91.90%
Emsisoft	94.59%	93.87%	93.69%	75.24%
Ikarus	94.59%	94.34%	93.69%	75.24%
GData	94.14%	93.87%	93.69%	90.95%
TrendMicro	94.14%	91.98%	92.79%	77.62%
NOD32	92.79%	88.68%	88.29%	95.24%
Sophos	92.79%	94.81%	94.14%	78.10%
Antiy-AVL	92.34%	91.98%	89.19%	72.38%
Fortinet	90.99%	89.15%	88.74%	71.43%
Overall Average	93.78%	92.88%	92.39%	82.29%

repackaging

AV Products	Insert	Rename	Change CFG	Str. Encrypt
Kaspersky	93.81%	73.33%	94.76%	90.95%
F-Secure	90.00%	90.00%	90.48%	68.57%
Emsisoft	83.81%	26.67%	82.86%	25.24%
Ikarus	83.81%	26.67%	83.33%	25.24%
GData	90.95%	90.48%	91.43%	88.10%
TrendMicro	61.90%	61.90%	63.81%	35.71%
NOD32	95.24%	91.90%	95.24%	90.48%
Sophos	54.29%	54.29%	54.76%	49.05%
Antiy-AVL	70.00%	19.05%	67.14%	19.52%
Fortinet	48.57%	15.71%	42.86%	16.67%
Overall Average	77.24%	55.00%	76.67%	50.95%

code obfuscation

November 2011

# Discussion Of **ADAM** System

## 1. Signature coverage.

We cannot verify if all anti-virus systems that we tested on VirusTotal apply the same detection logic as in their mobile versions.

## 2. Distribution model.

It is generally difficult to distribute malicious applications through the official AndroidMarket. However, we believe that hackers can upload any malware to the third-party markets.

# Future Work Of **ADAM** System

1. We try to extend our system to support **mobile version** anti-virus products and **dynamic** analysis system.
2. We try to add a new function that explore the **logic** of anti-virus engine.
3. Source code:  
<http://ansrlab.cse.cuhk.edu.hk/software/adam/>