



<http://flic.kr/phretor>

The Long Story of Short URLs

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
syssec

NECST
laboratory

European System Security Researchers

- The **research** leading to the **results presented in this talk** has received **funding** from the European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement no 257007.
- Builds on the FORWARD initiative, SysSec **aims** at:
 - creating a virtual center of **excellence**, to **consolidate** the systems security research community in **Europe**,
 - promoting cybersecurity **education**,
 - engaging a **think-tank** in discovering the threats and vulnerabilities,
 - creating an active research **roadmap** in the area, and
 - developing a joint working plan to conduct **collaborative research**.

Brief history of short URLs



Today is it just bit.ly and t.co?

- We observed up to **622** shortening services
- **Companies** and famous **bloggers** have started using their own custom domains (e.g., pep.si, ti.me, flic.kr)

Short URLs have become a sort of "**trendy gadget**"

How short URLs work

long URL

<http://example.com/very/long/?url=to&the=landing-page>

short URL


<http://ab.cd/d73fYfz>

"make me shorter"

URL shortening
service

RANDOM SUFFIX
IS GENERATED

How short URLs work cont'd




<http://ab.cd/d73fYfz> → <http://ab.cd/123fa1> → <http://ab.cd/44a8F> → <http://ab.cd/as9fYc>

Why short URLs could be misused

- **Users** have grown **accustomed** to see short URLs
- Users typically **trust** short URLs
- They look **harmless**

[http://srv153.example.com/very/long/?url=to&the=landing-
page&p=121&id=20&par=value&very=suspicious&long=url&that=would&probably=not&fi
t=into&your=IM&chat=window&or=may&be=broken&into=severla=lines](http://srv153.example.com/very/long/?url=to&the=landing-page&p=121&id=20&par=value&very=suspicious&long=url&that=would&probably=not&fi t=into&your=IM&chat=window&or=may&be=broken&into=severla=lines)

VS

<http://i.am/so-tiny> 

From the bad guys' perspective

Perfect mean for **masquerading** suspicious URLs

- Trivially **evade** naïve checks
- **Trendy** effect (e.g., Twitter, Facebook)
- **Robust** to those clients that break long URLs into multiple lines
- **Dynamic** redirection mechanisms (e.g., JavaScript, timeout, "Click to continue") make the landing page inaccessible to **automated scanners**

State of the art and related work

- Spam, phishing and other malicious activity on **social networks** use short URLs
 - [Stringhini et al., ACSAC **2010**], [Grier et al., CCS 2010], [Gao et al., IMC **2010**]
- "Quality" of the **content** aliased via short URLs is either very high or very low
 - [Kandylas et al., WWW **2010**]
- **Crawling** existing short URLs and use APIs to expand and analyze them
 - [Antoniades et al., WWW **2011**]
- Common nodes of the **redirection chains** are distinctive of bad short URLs
 - [Lee, S. and Kim, J., NDSS **2012**]

These work consider existing short URLs **found** on websites


None of them take the **end users** into account


A different perspective what is the impact on users?

- What kind of short URLs **users** typically encounter?
- Do users stumble upon **malicious** short URLs that **often**?
- Do users **perceive** the maliciousness of a short URL?
- Do shortening services take enough **countermeasures** to protect the users?

User-centered measurement

Data collection infrastructure





- <http://ab.cd/sfb4Ac>

- <http://ab.cd/asd31A>

- <http://ab.cd/5aD3B9>

- <http://ab.cd/419E9s>

- <http://example.com/container>

<http://ab.cd/sfb4Ac>

<http://ab.cd/asd31A>

<http://ab.cd/5aD3B9>

<http://ab.cd/419E9s>



Container page

How to avoid biased measurements?

- We do not ask a user to **become a collector**
- We provide a **useful service** that users may need
- Users **spontaneously** subscribe as collectors

What kind of **service** do we offer?

- <http://bit.ly/N9NwC> - points to Wikipedia
- <http://tinyurl.com/2ks> - points to Yahoo
- <http://tiny.cc/txnfl> - points to World Wi

World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) your choice

Long URL: <http://w3.org/>

Destination: <http://www.w3.org/>

Size: 28490 bytes

Type: text/html

Details: [see detailed analysis](#)

+flag as malicious!

Data that we collect

Raw data

Timestamp

Short URL

Client's IP

Referrer

Extracted data

Next hop

Redirection chain


Landing page

Title

Size


Content

...




Collected data

- Total 7,000 distinct users (estimate from 1,370,277 distinct IPs)
 - about 500 to 1,000 active users per day
 - about 20,000 to 50,000 short URLs sent each day (100,000 peaks)
- 24,953,881 distinct short URLs encountered by users while browsing



Geographical distribution of the collectors (GeoIP)




Top services encountered by users while browsing

Distinct URLs		Log entries	
8,179,229	bit.ly	13,407,588	bit.ly
1,047,790	tinyurl.com	2,056,857	tinyurl.com
922,682	t.co	1,658,808	t.co
651,074	ow.ly	1,154,522	ow.ly
607,939	goo.gl	1,045,336	goo.gl
508,969	fb.me	709,444	j.mp
481,398	4sq.com	648,435	is.gd
435,418	tl.gd	618,033	4sq.com
369,960	j.mp	576,815	fb.me
332,118	is.gd	485,221	durl.me


(as of April 2011)

Type of content aliased via short URLs

- We categorize landing pages and container pages
- We use a human-maintained list of categories (DMOZ Open Directory Project)



What happens when users **click** on a short URL?




CONTAINER PAGE CATS. $\xrightarrow{\# \text{ Short URLs}}$ LANDING PAGE CATS.


$\rho \rightarrow 0$ Many **outbound** short URLs (**aggregators**, e.g., Twitter)


$\rho \rightarrow 1$ Many **inbound** short URLs (**landing pages**, e.g., news, blogs)

ρ	Category						
0.00	naturism	0.18	artnudes	0.36	weapons	0.75	shopping
0.01	personalfinance	0.21	antispyware	0.36	cleaning	0.78	games
0.01	do-it-yourself	0.23	drinks	0.37	dating	0.80	news
0.03	pets	0.25	medical	0.39	vacation	0.82	government
0.04	gardening	0.25	weather	0.40	religion	0.88	chat
0.07	clothing	0.30	onlinegames	0.42	culinary	0.90	blog
0.07	mail	0.32	jobsearch	0.45	filehosting	0.91	socialnetworking
0.09	banking	0.33	sportnews	0.52	kidstimewasting	1.00	contraception
0.12	abortion	0.33	gambling	0.55	ecommerce	1.00	childcare
0.12	instantmessaging	0.36	drugs	0.67	adult	1.00	astrology
0.13	jewelry	0.36	searchengines	0.68	audio-video	1.00	cellphones
0.18	hacking	0.36	weapons	0.69	sports	1.00	onlineauctions
						1.00	onlinepayment


$$\rho = \frac{In(cat)}{In(cat) + Out(cat)}$$









Content-specific vs. general-purpose services








Security aspects related to short URLs

Malicious short URLs encountered by users

Category	Short URLs	Long URLs	Ratio
Phishing	88	79	1.11
Malware	1,161	1,083	1.07
Spam	731	694	1.05

Blacklist	Phishing	Malware	Spam
Spamhaus	-	-	694
Phishtank	61	-	-
Wepawet	-	266	-
Safe Browsing	18	817	-

What type of sites contain malicious short URLs?



<http://ab.cd/sfb4Ac>

<http://ab.cd/asd31A>

<http://ab.cd/5aD3B9>

<http://ab.cd/419E9s>

<http://ab.cd/sfb4Ac>

. . .

<http://ab.cd/5aD3B9>

<http://ab.cd/419E9s>




The diagram illustrates a collection of URLs on the left, each with a line extending from its end towards a central point. From this point, five lines radiate outwards to the left, connecting to the first five URLs. Another line extends from the same central point downwards and to the left, connecting to the URL following the ellipsis. A final line extends from the bottom-most URL to the same central point. To the right of this central point is a large rectangle representing a document page, with a folded top-right corner. The text "Malicious page" is centered within this rectangle.

Malicious
page

Aliasing of malicious pages using short URLs

Drive-by and spam landing pages are more aliased than benign ones.





Container page 1



Container page 2


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Container page N


Dissemination of malicious short URLs

Spam short URLs are disseminated on a larger number of container pages.



Lifespan of malicious short URLs

Malicious short URLs typically **survive longer** than benign ones.



Exception: a spam campaign (Storm botnet?) with 1,806 short URLs deleted by tinyurl.com's administrators.

Are shortening services taking countermeasures?

1. Prepare a list of benign and malicious long URLs
2. Shorten them via the top 6 shortening services (e.g., bit.ly, is.gd, tinyurl.com)
 - 2.1. Do they **accept** malicious URLs (spam, phishing, drive-by download)?
3. Try to access the malicious shortened URLs
 - 3.1. Do they **warn** the users when they **resolve** the short URLs?
4. Modify the benign long URLs (under our control) and make them malicious
 - 4.1. Do they **periodically** check their databases of **existing** short URLs?

long URL <http://example.com/very/long/?url=to&the=landing-page>

"make me shorter"

URL shortening
service

"sorry, can't shorten this URL"

Yes!

"is this long URL malicious?"

Blacklist

```
graph TD; URL[long URL http://example.com/very/long/?url=to&the=landing-page] -- "make me shorter" --> Service[URL shortening service]; Service -- "sorry, can't shorten this URL" --> Out1[ ]; Service -- "is this long URL malicious?" --> Blacklist[Blacklist]; Blacklist -- "Yes!" --> Service;
```

The diagram illustrates the logic of a URL shortening service. It starts with a long URL being input to the service with the request "make me shorter". The service then checks if it can shorten the URL. If not, it returns "sorry, can't shorten this URL". If it can, it checks if the URL is malicious by asking "is this long URL malicious?". If the answer is "Yes!", the service can then shorten the URL. If not, it presumably returns an error (not explicitly shown).

Malicious long URLs accepted by top services

Service	Malware		Phishing		Spam	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
bit.ly	997	99.7	1,000	100.0	1,000	100.0
durl.me	898	89.8	937	93.7	216	21.6
goo.gl	999	99.9	994	99.4	1,000	100.0
is.gd	640	64.0	358	35.8	143	14.3
migre.me	201	20.1	402	40.2	235	23.5
tinyurl.com	997	99.7	996	99.6	998	99.8
Overall	4,732	78.9	4,687	78.1	3,592	59.9

short URL <http://i.am/so-nice>



"please resolve this"


URL shortening
service

"sorry, can't resolve this URL"

Yes!

"is the long URL malicious?"

Aliases DB



Alerting users when accessing bad short URLs

Service	Malware	Phishing	Spam
bit.ly	100.0	97.5	99.9
durl.me	100.0	100.0	100.0
goo.gl	66.4	96.9	78.7
is.gd	43.3	42.9	78.7
migre.me	46.8	40.6	95.7
tinyurl.com	43.5	43.2	77.1
Overall	66.6	70.2	88.4

dynamic long URL `http://our.server/dynamic-page.php`

"make me shorter"

`http://ab.cd/good-today`

URL shortening
service

No!

"is this long URL malicious?"


Blacklist



```
graph TD; A["dynamic long URL http://our.server/dynamic-page.php"] -- "make me shorter" --> B["URL shortening service"]; B --> C["http://ab.cd/good-today"]; B -- "is this long URL malicious?" --> D["Blacklist"]; D -- "No!" --> B;
```

The diagram illustrates a workflow for a URL shortening service. It begins with a 'dynamic long URL' (http://our.server/dynamic-page.php) which is sent to a 'URL shortening service' with the request 'make me shorter'. The service then returns a shorter URL (http://ab.cd/good-today). Simultaneously, the service sends a query 'is this long URL malicious?' to a 'Blacklist'. The blacklist responds with 'No!', indicating the URL is safe.

after 24 hours <http://our.server/dynamic-page.php?redirect=http://evil.com>



Deferred maliciousness

Threat	Shortened	Blocked	Not Blocked
Malware	162	0%	100%
Phishing	180	0%	100%
Spam	150	0%	100%
Overall	492	0%	100%

Limitations & future work or what we still need to do


- We collect short URLs only when container pages are visited.
- We track clicks on short URLs, but we collected 42,147 clicks (too early to draw conclusions).
- We have not tracked whether existing, benign short URLs turn into malicious short URLs.

Conclusions: What is the impact on users?

- What do users **use** short URLs for?
 - Share ephemeral resources to user-generated content (e.g., social nets)
- Do users stumble upon short URLs that **often**?
 - Not very often: ~1K over 16M
- Do users **perceive** the maliciousness of a short URL?
 - Not much: almost no one clicked on our "flag as malicious" link. Also confirmed by [Onarlioglu et al., NDSS 2012]
- Do URL shortening services take enough **countermeasures** to protect the users?
 - Some of them use **blacklists** but do **not** proactively check **existing** aliases

We're still collecting short URLs

- 16,075,693 over 24,953,881 analyzed thoroughly
- No big changes in the **new** portion of the dataset



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